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THE EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERSTATE
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS ON SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDIC1TION
INTRODUCTION
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (LAD)' is an interstate com-
pact2 that furnishes a procedure by which a prisoner currently incarcer-
ated in one state 3-the "sending state" 4---can be transferred to another
state-the "receiving state" 5 -to dispose of outstanding criminal charges
1. Initially proposed in 1956 by the Council of State Governments, see Council of
State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, at 78-85 (1956) [here-
inafter cited as Council of State Governments-1956], the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers (LAD) has been enacted in 48 states, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin
Islands, Washington, D.C., and the United States. Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401,
3403 (1985). Only Mississippi and Louisiana have not enacted it. See 18 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 1 historical note (West 1985) (listing complementary state versions of the IAD). "A
detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sen-
tence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdic-
tion." S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4864, 4865; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
2. A compact is an agreement, a contract. The word is applied often to agreements
between nations and states. See, eg., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 557-59 (1983)
(negotiated agreement between those two states); H-inderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 95 (1938) (agreement entered into by Colorado and New
Mexico with approval of Congress); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (I 1 Peters) 185, 209 (1837)
(nations and states have the sovereign power to enter into compacts establishing their
boundaries). Agreements between nations are usually called treaties. Courts have spo-
ken of compacts as "treaties" between states. See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104; Burrus v.
Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106
S. Ct. 562 (1985). One major difference between treaties and compacts is that while Con-
gress can invalidate or modify a treaty through subsequent legislation, see Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
195 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); F. Zimmermann & M.
Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 1925, at 32 (1951), a party to a compact cannot
change its terms unilaterally. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
The compact clause of the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall, with-
out the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State .... . United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Congress consented in ad-
vance to the LAD by enacting the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat.
909 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1982)) (consent "given to any two or more
States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance
in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and
policies"); see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 & n.9 (1981); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4866; H.R. Rep.
No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). But cf Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 450-52 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (the IAD is not a law that requires congressional consent under the com-
pact clause).
3. Since Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No.
91-538, 84 Stat. 1397 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. App. (1982)), the United States and
Washington, D.C. participate fully in the IAD as "states." See United States v. Mauro,
436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978).
4. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. II(b) (1982).
5. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. II(c) (1982).
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against him in the receiving state.6 Its main objective is "to encourage
the expeditious and orderly disposition" of these charges7 to reduce the
prisoner and prison officials' period of uncertainty concerning the total
length of the prisoner's sentence.A This benefits the prisoner,9 officials
working in the penal system' 0 and society in general." The procedures
governing transfer and disposition of charges may be initiated either by
the prisoner12 or by the prosecuting authorities of the receiving state.'
3
6. A detainer may be filed for purposes other than prosecuting outstanding charges,
for example, to merely question the individual. See Note, The Interrelationship Between
Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, and The
Speedy TrialAct of 1974: United States v. Mauro, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 285, 289 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Habeus CorpusAd Prosequendum]. This Note, however, will discuss
only those situations where detainers are interposed for the purpose of bringing the indi-
vidual to trial in receiving states. This is the case in approximately one-half to two-thirds
of the instances where detainers are lodged against prisoners. See Carchman v. Nash, 105
S. Ct. 3401, 3417 & n.13 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982).
8. See infra note 63.
9. See infra note 63.
10. See infra notes 63, 128-34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying note 127.
12. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III (1982). Article III was included in the IAD so that
prisoners could force disposition of any detainer lodged against them. See Council of
State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 78-79 (distinguishing IAD art. III from art.
IV; the former "makes the clearing of detainers possible at the instance of the prisoner").
See infra note 89. Detainers harm the prisoner's current term of incarceration. See Ben-
nett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945,
at 8, 9 [hereinafter cited as Bennett I]. The mere existence of a detainer has caused
prisoners to be denied parole. Id. at 9-10. In one case, the court noted that the lodging of
a detainer caused the prisoner to be sent to a "maximum medium" security state peniten-
tiary, rather than to an institution for youthful offenders along with his older codefend-
ant, even though the two had prior records that were "practically identical;" it also
affected his work assignments and barred him from working outside the penitentiary. See
United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1961); see
also United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 799 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (prisoner will be
denied the privileges accorded a well-behaved prisoner, such as trusty status, desirable
work assignments within the prison, work outside the prison, and parole, throughout his
term solely because a detainer has been lodged against him); Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark.
459, 464, 283 S.W.2d 162, 165 (1955) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (due to the lodging of a
detainer, prisoner ineligible for parole, so that he must serve 15 years in prison rather
than possibly as few as 5 years; he will also be denied trusty status); Note, The Effect of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Upon Federal Prisoner Transfer, 46 Fordham L.
Rev. 492, 510 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prisoner Transfer]; Note, The Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers: Defining the Federal Role, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1017, 1019-20 (1978).
Detainers often have been abused, because the responsible authorities do not need to
make out a prima-facie case. Many police departments and sheriffs can file them merely
on suspicion. Bennett I, supra, at 9. Mr. Bennett, then the acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, see Bennett, "The Last Full Ounce", 23 Fed. Probation, June 1959, at
20, 20 [hereinafter cited as Bennett II], stated that in fiscal 1958 there were 380 detainers
filed against prisoners at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary. See id. at 21. Of those, 211
were withdrawn without prosecution. Id. Bennett referred to them as a "nuisance," and
he implied that many were placed in the prisoners' files vindictively. See id. (the lifting of
detainers from a prisoner's file "usually" occurred "about the time the prisoners involved
were finishing their sentences"); see also Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 810,
415 P.2d 809, 812, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (1966) (en banc) (prosecutor refused to act on
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The process established by the lAD is rigorous;14 the penalties for non-
compliance are severe.' 5
filed detainers, despite repeated requests by the prisoners, writing: "As far as I am con-
cerned. . .[the prisoners] can sit and rot in prison for the rest of their lives."). For these
reasons, the prisoner may be sufficiently confident of his innocence of the charges under-
lying the detainer or desirous of minimizing the harm to his present term of incarceration
to request disposition of the detainer.
The LAD and its intrastate counterpart, which the Council initially named the "Intra-
state Detainer Statute", see Council of State Governments--1956, supra note 1, at 76, but
later renamed the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UIDDA), see in-
fra text accompanying note 83, are both intended to give the prisoner subject to a de-
tainer the opportunity to eliminate its harmful effects to his rehabilitation by "provid[ing]
a way for him to test the substantiality of detainers placed against him and to secure final
judgment on any indictments, informations or complaints outstanding against him."
Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 76-77; see also Carchman v. Nash,
105 S. CL 3401, 3412-13 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Mauro, 436
U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
For further discussion of the well recognized harmful effects of detainers, see generally
United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing cases), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 29-35
(1979); Dauber, Reforming the Detainer Systenv A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 691-
99 (1971); Shelton, Unconstitutional Uncertainty: A Study of the Use of Detainers, I Pro-
spectus 119, 119-27 (1968); Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Admin-
istration, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1191-94 (1948); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy
Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 828, 835-36 (1964); Note, De-
tainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 Wash. U.L.Q. 417, 418-23.
13. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV (1982). The IAD provides no mechanism whereby the
sending state can initiate transfer and disposition of charges. This probably is not acci-
dental, because prosecutors and correction officials in the sending state may have no de-
sire to enforce the IAD strictly against the receiving state. See Bennett II, supra note 12,
at 23 ("opposition to [the IAD] may continue to be expected from officials who have no
interest in the rehabilitative aspects of criminal justice and who wish to continue manipu-
lating detainers for quasi-judicial and vengeful purposes"). See infra note 52. The author
has been unable to locate any cases where the sending state moved to intervene to enforce
its rights under the LAD.
14. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a)-(e), IV(a)-(d) (1982).
15. See id. arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982). LAD art. III(d) reads, in relevant part:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated
[under art. III] prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of impris-
onment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
Art IV(e) reads:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated
[under art. IV] prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment [at the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of
this agreement], such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same
with prejudice.
Art. V(c) reads:
If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of
said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to
trial within the period provided in article III [(180 days)] or article IV [(120
days)] hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment,
information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
1986] 1211
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While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, 6 the courts of
appeals have disagreed, in the context of habeas corpus proceedings, on
the nature of IAD violations. If IAD violations are "strictly jurisdic-
tional" in nature,' 7 they may be raised for the first time in federal or state
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any
force or effect.
Although there have been no reported challenges to the constitutionality of the time
limitations contained in the IAD, the similarly restrictive, legislatively-imposed time lim-
its of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (STA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), see infra notes
102-03, were twice declared unconstitutional by the same district court judge as violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers. See United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627,
630 (D. Md. 1981) (Young, J.), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1977) (Young, J.), aff'd on other
grounds, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); see also United States
v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit rejected Judge
Young's position, holding that "trial rights are a proper subject of legislation," and that
the time limits contained in the STA do not "intrude upon the zone of judicial self-
administration to such a degree as to 'prevento- the [judiciary] from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions.'" United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 698 (4th
Cir. 1982) (brackets in original).
16. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 106 S. Ct. 263, 264 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
17. The critical question is whether violations of the IAD divest courts of subject
matter jurisdiction. Generally, appellate court review is restricted to points addressed at
trial. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209-11 (1981); Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941). One issue that
may be raised initially on appeal is absence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mansfield,
C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, I11 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); United States v. McGrath, 558 F.2d
1102, 1106 (2d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124, 1140 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Sewell v.
United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir. 1969); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2).
This issue may be raised initially on appeal because absence of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is fatal to a prosecution; a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is
void. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 704 & n.10 (1982); Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th
Cir. 1984). Two situations must be distinguished. Certain facts are "strictly jurisdic-
tional," Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893), while other facts
are "quasi jurisdictional." Id. (emphasis in original). The latter category of facts, if erro-
neously found by the court, are subject only to direct attack, and are not subject to collat-
eral attack. See id. This category of facts includes:
allegations and proof of the requisite diversity of citizenship, or the amount in
controversy in a Federal court, . . . the fact that one of the heirs of an estate
had reached his majority, when the act provided that the estate should not be
sold if all the heirs were minors;. . . and others of a kindred nature, where the
want of jurisdiction does not go to the subject-matter or the parties, but to a
preliminary fact necessary to be proven to authorize the court to act.
Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted).
On the other hand, strictly jurisdictional facts are those which, if not present, leave the
court's judgment void. Id. at 173. "Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of
power will a judgment be rendered void." Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No.
27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972); see Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 949 (6th Cir.
1985); Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 550 F. Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Hobbs v.
United States Office of Personnel Mgmt., 485 F. Supp. 456, 458 (M.D. Fla. 1980); J.
Moore, J. Lucas & K. Sinclair, Jr., 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.25[2], at 60-226 to -
227 (2d ed. 1985).
A "clear usurpation of power" occurred in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). In
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habeus corpus proceedings.'" The Third and Fifth Circuits hold that a
Kalb, the question presented was whether a state court that had properly exercised juris-
diction originally had its jurisdiction divested automatically when one party filed a peti-
tion for bankruptcy. See id. at 435-36. The Court held that through the Frazier-Lemke
Act "Congress intended to, and did deprive the [state court] of the power and jurisdiction
to continue or maintain in any manner" its proceedings once the state court received
notice of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 440. The court granted relief in the
collateral proceeding before it. See id. at 436, 443-44. The Court found the statutory
exclusion to be "self-executing," id. at 443, that is, the act of filing the petition automati-
cally relieved the petitioner "of the necessity of litigation elsewhere and its consequent
expense." Id
Like the Frazier-Lemke Act, the IAD commands, through mandatory language, that
upon the occurrence of IAD violations, the court in the receiving state divest itself of
jurisdiction over the charges "with prejudice." Compare Kalb, 308 U.S. at 440 ("The
filing of a petition. . . shall immediately subject the [petitioner] and all his property...
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [bankruptcy] court.") (quoting Frazier-Lemke Act
§ (n)) with 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(d) (1982) ("If trial is not had on any [charge]
contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprison-
ment, such [charge] shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice."), id. art. IV(e) ("If trial is not had on any
[charge] contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place
of imprisonment. . ., such [charge] shall not be of any further force or effect, and the
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.") and IAD art. V(c) (on
the occurrence of certain events, "the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the
[charge] has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and
any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect"). These provisions are
statutorily self-executing, just as the Frazier-Lemke Act is.
One reason many courts have not viewed IAD violations as jurisdictional is that in
State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 191 A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1963), it was held that the
TAD's provisions are not self-executing. See id. at 387, 191 A.2d at 763; see also Gayles
v. Hedman, 309 Minn. 289, 291, 244 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1976); State v. Lippolis, 107
N.J. Super. 137, 147, 257 A.2d 705, 711 (App. Div. 1969) (Kolovsky, J., dissenting), rev'd
per curiam, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970); People v. White, 33 A.D.2d 217, 221, 305
N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (1969); People v. Squitieri, 91 Misc. 2d 290, 295, 397 N.Y.S.2d 888,
892 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The West court correctly held that a court in the sending state had
no power to dismiss charges of the receiving state. See West, 79 NJ. Super. at 386-87,
191 A.2d at 762. Its error occurred in confusing the place in which the provisions of the
TAD are self-executing with the fact of whether they are self-executing. Although the
IAD does "contemplate[] a judicial proceeding or act in the receiving state resulting in
dismissal of the pending indictments," id. at 387, 191 A.2d at 763, the very existence of
the violation mandates the judicial proceeding or act in the receiving state, making the
provisions self-executing. Cf Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 44043 (1940) (provisions
of the Frazier-Lemke Act are self-executing when bankruptcy petition is filed).
18. If IAD violations are strictly jurisdictional, they may be raised for the first time in
a proceeding under the federal habeas corpus statutes, see 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2255
(West 1971 & Supp. 1986), or in a proceeding under their state counterparts, see, e.g.,
Cal. Penal Code §§ 1473-1508 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 65, §§ 1-39
(Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp. 1985); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:67-1 to -36 (West 1976 & Supp.
1985); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7001-7012 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1986). In these
proceedings, the petitioned court will act only to correct "fundamental defects" in the
prior proceedings, or if there are "exceptional circumstances where the need for the rem-
edy afforded by the writ of habeus corpus is apparent." See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 428 (1962) (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939)); see also Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974); Shack v. Attorney General, 776 F.2d 1170, 1172
(3d Cir. 1985); Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
263 (1985); United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 590 (3d Cir. 1980); Edwards v.
United States, 564 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Absence of subject matter
1986] 1213
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violation of the IAD can merit relief under the habeas corpus statutes, 19
although neither court appears to have adopted the position that IAD
violations divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction.20 The First,21
Fourth, 22 Seventh, 23 Eighth24 and Tenth Circuits25 hold that IAD viola-
tions alone do not warrant relief under the habeas corpus statutes unless
the prisoner at least demonstrates that actual prejudice resulted from the
violation.26 The Second Circuit holds that IAD violations never merit
habeas corpus relief.27 The Ninth Circuit has tried to reconcile conflict-
ing intracircuit decisions by ruling that only violations of the IAD's time
jurisdiction is such a fundamental defect. See supra note 17. It always entitles a peti-
tioner to habeas corpus relief. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
19. See Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 590 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Shack v. Attorney General,
776 F.2d 1170, 1173 (3d Cir. 1985).
20. See Gibson v. Klevenhagen, 777 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing
applicability of rules of waiver); United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 589-90 (3d Cir.
1980) (a defendant who raises the IAD violation has an absolute defense).
21. See Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 557-58 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 867
(1980). The Fasano court applied the standard of Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333
(1974), that claimed non-jurisdictional errors are cognizable in a collateral attack only if
the defendant is prejudiced and the error is "a fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a miscarriage of justice," so that it "present[s] exceptional circumstances where
the need for the remedy afflorded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent," see Davis, 417
U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). See Fasano, 615
F.2d at 557-58.
22. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 263
(1985). In Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910
(1982), the court held that a violation of one of the IAD's anti-shuttling provisions is not
subject to collateral review at all. See id. at 409; see also Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d at
606-07.
23. See United States ex reL Holleman v. Duckworth, 770 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 828 (1986). But see Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 679
& n.7 (7th Cir. 1979) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
24. See Shigemura v. United States, 726 F.2d 380, 381 (8th Cir. 1984) (per cuiam);
Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979); see
also Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553, 562 (E.D. Ark. 1978), affidper curiam, 596 F.2d
339 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979).
25. See Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926 (1982); see also Gray v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209,
1215 (D. Kan. 1978), affd per curiam, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979).
26. Under this view, the prisoner would need to demonstrate that he "in fact suffered
the particular harm the IAD was designed to prevent," which is discriminatory treatment
due to the existence of the detainer. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Noncon-
stitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers, 83 Colum, L. Rev. 975, 1027-28 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus
Review); see also Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
263 (1985); Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 952 (1979); Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The
Third Circuit has stated that prejudice existed due to counsel's failure to raise the IAD
violation at trial, since had he done so the complaint would have been dismissed. United
States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1980). This view of "prejudice" merely
restates the proposition that IAD violations are an absolute defense. Failure to raise the
issue at trial is not "the particular harm the IAD was designed to prevent." See Federal
Habeas Corpus Review, supra, at 1027.
27. See Rivera v. Harris, 643 F.2d 86, 90 n.2 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 454
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limitations merit habeas corpus relief because those limitations protect
the constitutional right to a speedy trial."8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that because the anti-shuttling provisions, which prohibit more than one
transfer of the prisoner to the receiving state,29 do not protect any consti-
tutional right, violations of those provisions do not merit habeas corpus
relief.3 0 The Sixth Circuit also has produced conflicting intracircuit deci-
sions. One panel's decision implies that IAD violations divest a court of
subject matter jurisdiction.3 Two later panels rejected this analysis.32
One state supreme court has held that IAD violations deprive courts of
subject matter jurisdiction.33
This Note argues that under the IAD receiving states agree to exercise
their subject matter jurisdiction subject to conditions. Failure of the re-
ceiving state to prosecute the prisoner in accordance with the restrictions
imposed by the IAD compels the court in the receiving state hearing the
matter to divest itself automatically of subject matter jurisdiction over
the outstanding charges.34 This Note concludes that because absence of
subject matter jurisdiction always entitles a petitioner to relief under the
habeas corpus statutes,35 habeas corpus relief should be granted when-
ever a violation of the IAD occurs and the prisoner cannot secure other
U.S. 339 (1981); Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) (per
curiamn).
28. See Carlson v. Hong, 707 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
29. See infra note 44.
30. See Carlson v. Hong, 707 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
31. See Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979). Although the Stroble decision is not explicit in its holding, a later decision of the
Sixth Circuit explained that Stroble stands for the proposition that "a violation of the
IAD is jurisdictional and deprives a trial court of any power to proceed with criminal
proceedings on the indictment." See Mars v. United States, 615 F.2d 704, 706 n.8 (6th
Cir.) (answering the dissent, which argued that Stroble was controlling), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 849 (1980).
32. See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 536-37 (6th Cir. 1981); Mars v.
United States, 615 F.2d 704, 706 & n.8 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); see
also United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the contention
that LAD violations are jurisdictional, but not mentioning Stroble).
33. See Moore v. Whyte, 266 S.E.2d 137, 141 (V. Va. 1980). Two other courts
reached this conclusion, but were later overruled. See Enright v. United States, 434 F.
Supp. 1056, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), overruled per curiam, Edwards v. United States, 564
F.2d 652, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that IAD violations are not cognizable in habeas
corpus proceedings, without mentioning Enright); People v. Jacobs, 198 Colo. 75, 77, 596
P.2d 1187, 1187-88 (1979) (en banc), overruled, People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 694-95
(Colo. 1984) (en banc).
34. The court in the receiving state must first determine that an LAD violation has
occurred and then take the required actions because the sending state is powerless to
compel such actions merely by enacting the IAD. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
35. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934); see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 182
(1947); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(4), 2255 (1982);
Mills & Herrmann, Collateral Attacks on Convictions A Survey of Federal Remedies, 12 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 27, 30 (1978); see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962).
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relief.3 6 The prisoner should not be required to demonstrate actual prej-
udice to be accorded such relief; violation of the IAD suffices.
I. OPERATION OF THE IAD
Contrary to the view of various courts and commentators,37 the IAD
is not merely a statute. Rather, it is an interstate compact. This distinc-
tion is critical because a compact is not subject to unilateral alteration.3
A compact establishes a contractual relationship between the signatory
states.39 The terms of the contract created by the IAD govern the prose-
36. Normally, a habeas corpus petitioner must exhaust available state remedies before
a federal court can grant the requested relief. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)
(per curiam); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). In the interests ofcomity, the state's highest
court should have the opportunity to review the claim before the federal court intervenes.
See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17
(1944) (per curiam); Moore v. Fulcomer, 609 F. Supp. 171, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1985). IAD
cases apply the exhaustion doctrine. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 605-06 (4th
Cir.) (indicating that the prisoner has given the state supreme court the opportunity to
review his claim), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 263 (1985); Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673,
675-76 (7th Cir. 1979) (refusing to entertain prisoner's petition because he had not ex-
hausted his state remedies), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
37. See Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th
Cir. 1979); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); Grizzell v. Tennes-
see, 601 F. Supp. 230, 231 (M.D. Tenn.), appeal dismissed mem., 746 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir.
1984); Gray v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (D. Kan. 1978), afJ'd per curiam, 608
F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979); People v. Squitieri, 91 Misc. 2d 2sO, 294-95, 397 N.Y.S.2d
888, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1977); State v. Brown, 118 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 348 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Ct.
App. 1984); Federal Habeas Corpus Review, supra note 26, at 1005; Prisoner Transfer,
supra note 12, at 525.
38. See Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3418 n.18, 3419 n.19 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 12-13 (1823); Bush v. Muncy, 659
F.2d 402, 411 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); President, Managers, &
Co. v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 13 N.J. Eq. 46, 51-52 (Ch. 1860); State v. Hoofman, 9
Md. 28, 30-31 (1856); Zimmermann & Wendell, supra note 2, at 32; Comment, Some
Legal and Practical Problems of the Interstate Compact, 45 Yale L.J. 324, 329 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Some Legal and Practical Problems]; cf Texas v. New Mexico, 462
U.S. 554, 564 (1983) ("no court may order relief inconsistent with [a compact's] express
terms").
39. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106
(1938) (a compact is "binding upon the citizens of each State" to the agreement); Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893) ("Compacts . . .cover all stipulations affecting
the conduct or claims of the parties."); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d
830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975) (IAD is "binding" on the party states); State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,
134 W. Va. 278, 290, 58 S.E.2d 766, 773 (1950) (a compact "creates what is in legal effect
a contract binding on all the parties thereto"), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 22 (1951);
see also F. Zimmermann & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 7
(1976) ("The substantive law of compacts is principally contract law."); Some Legal and
Practical Problems, supra note 38, at 329 (statutes inconsistent with compacts are invalid
because they impair the obligation of contracts). The IAD explicitly states that it is a
contract. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, preamble ("The contracting States solemnly agree
.. ") (emphasis added).
The exchange of mutual promises by the states is detrimental, and so suffices as consid-
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cution of a prisoner of one state by another state. The sending state
promises to cede custody over its prisoner to the receiving state for the
limited purpose of disposing of all' outstanding charges against the pris-
oner.4" As consideration for the sending state's promise to deliver the
prisoner, the receiving state agrees to limit its subject matter jurisdiction
over the prisoner. The IAD automatically imposes conditions on the re-
ceiving state's jurisdiction42 through its time limitations43 and its anti-
eration supporting the IAD. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893). A
valid bilateral contract exists, with benefits accruing to both states involved. The receiv-
ing state gains the opportunity to vindicate its laws before time can erode the strength of
its case. See S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (letter from R. Kleindienst, Deputy
Attorney General, to Chairman Celler of the House Comm. on the Judiciary), reprinted
in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4864, 4868; H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1970) (same). Additionally, the receiving state obtains the prisoner with a mini-
mum of red tape. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 78. The
sending state profits from the IAD by a reduction in the uncertainty of the length of the
prisoner's term of incarceration, which assists it to properly plan its program of rehabili-
tation. See Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3413 n.6 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 1 (1982); Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at
75. See infra note 63.
40. See 18 U.S.C. app. 2, art. III(d) (1982); id. arts. IV(b) and (e) (acting conjunc-
tively to equal the force of id. art. III(d)).
41. See id. art. V(g). The action taken by the sending state in delivering up the pris-
oner to the receiving state is voluntary. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922)
(a state may choose to waive "its strict right to exclusive custody of [the prisoner] for
vindication of its laws in order that the other [state] may also subject him to conviction of
crime against it"); id at 261 (no jurisdiction can acquire personal jurisdiction over a
prisoner without the consent of the imprisoning jurisdiction); Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 366, 370 (1872) (if the governor of the sending state refuses to extradite the
prisoner, "there is no means of compulsion"); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
66, 109 (1860) ("The performance of th[e] duty [to extradite an individual]. . . is left to
depend on the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into wvith the other
States when it adopted the Constitution of the United States, and became a member of
the Union."); see also Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 Wash. U.LQ.,
417, 424 & n.31. The LAD gives legal force to detainers. See Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d
693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that under the IAD, each participating state gives
up "part of its 'rights' to hold prisoners"), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106
S. CL 562 (1985); cf. Hincks, The Need for Comity in Criminal Administration, 9 Fed.
Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at 3, 3 (detainers have no intrinsic power) (pre-IAD state-
ment). The IAD reserves to the governor of the sending state the right to refuse to sur-
render a prisoner, on his own motion or on the prisoner's motion. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2,
art. IV(a) (1982); see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363 n.28 (1978);
O'Connor v. Cole, 17 Pa. D. & C.3d 233, 234 (C.P. Cumberland Co. 1980); Council of
State Governments--1956, supra note 1, at 78.
42. See Burrnus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1984) (a receiving state can
obtain prisoners through the TAD only if it "meets certain conditions" listed in the com-
pact) (emphasis added), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985);
United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (the
IAD empowers states to obtain prisoners, "subject to certain conditions") (emphasis ad-
ded), rev'd, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420-24
(1886) (extradition agreement limits the subject matter jurisdiction under which the pris-
oner is to be tried). Contra Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1978) (the
jurisdiction of the court derives from the offense rather than from the IAD).
43. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c) (1982).
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shuttling provisions.' The receiving state must accept the sending
state's offer subject to these conditions.45 By enacting the IAD, the state
legislature commands its judiciary and prosecutors, when that state acts
as a receiving state, to respect the conditions imposed on its exercise of
jurisdiction over the prisoner and the offense.4 6
The receiving state promises the sending state, and commands its own
judiciary, to forfeit subject matter jurisdiction over the charges underly-
ing the detainer "with prejudice"47 should any of the participants in the
44. See id. arts. III(d), IV(e). The return of the prisoner to the sending state "auto-
matically" extinguishes the detainer. See Bunus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 702 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); see also Walker v.
King, 448 F. Supp. 580, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (permitting only one transfer advances one
purpose of the IAD); People v. Reyes, 98 Cal. App. 3d 524, 530, 159 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575-
76 (1979) (18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(e) allows only one rendition) (citing Walker, 448 F.
Supp. at 586); Hughes v. District Ct., 197 Colo. 396, 400, 593 P.2d 702, 705 (1979) (en
banc) (IAD "Article IV(e) allows the receiving state only one rendition"); Common-
wealth v. Diggs, 273 Pa. Super. 121, 122-23, 416 A.2d 1119, 1120 (1979) (per curiam)
(receiving state must "finally dispose" of all charges before returning the prisoner to the
sending state) (dictum). Compare 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(d) (1982) (instructing the
court to dismiss the charges with prejudice if the prisoner is returned to the sending state
before trial) and id. art. IV(e) (same) with id. art. V(c) (instructing the court to dismiss
the charges with prejudice and to recognize that the detainer is without any further
"force or effect" if the receiving state refuses to accept the prisoner or does not bring him
to trial within the applicable time limit). For this reason, various courts have referred to
these sections as "anti-shuttling" provisions. See United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 1059,
1060 (9th Cir. 1985); Burrus v. Turnbo, 743 F.2d 693, 703 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated as
moot sub nom. Hijar v. Burrus, 106 S. Ct. 562 (1985); People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d
993, 1000 (Colo. 1986) (en banc).
45. "It is fundamental that no act constitutes an acceptance unless it is an acceptance
of the offer which has been made." Zimmermann & Wendell, supra note 39, at 8; accord
Iselin v. United States, 271 U.S. 136, 139 (1926); W. Jaeger, 1 Williston on Contracts
§ 73 (3d ed. 1958 reprint); Restatement of Contracts § 59 (1932); cf Carchman v. Nash,
105 S. Ct. 3401, 3419 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (amendment of IAD by the Kentucky
legislature "expressly notes. . . that it can be 'binding only . . . between those party
states which specifically execute the same' amendment") (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 440.455(1) (1985)).
46. "The States with the consent of Congress may enter into compacts with each
other and the provisions of such compacts may limit the agreeing States in the exercise of
their respective [governmental] powers." United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52 (1938).
The state legislature, which defines the jurisdiction of its statutory courts, including its
criminal trial courts, has the power to limit the jurisdiction it vests in those courts. See,
e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763 n.27 (1982);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 197 (1947) (Reed, J., dissenting); Gardner & Florence
Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 754 F.2d 478, 481 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985); Fantis Foods,
Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 324, 402 N.E.2d 122, 124, 425 N.Y.S.2d
783, 785 (1980). The IAD is a limitation on the receiving state. The command to dismiss
complaints with prejudice is directed at courts in receiving states. See State v. West, 79
N.J. Super. 379, 386, 191 A.2d 758, 762 (App. Div. 1963); accord Mokone v. Fenton, 710
F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Gallipoli, 599 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir.
1979); Dodson v. Cooper, 705 P.2d 500, 504 (Colo. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 857 (1986); Giardino v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 116, 126-27, 475 A.2d 298, 304 (1984);
Gayles v. Hedman, 309 Minn. 289, 291, 244 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1976) (per curiam).
47. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982). The sanction of dismissal
with prejudice has been described by Congress as having the effect of "bar[ring] any
future prosecution against the defendant for charges arising out of the same conduct."
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prosecution in either state fail to comply with the conditions of trans-
fer.48 This promise is necessary for enforcement purposes because the
LAD is interjurisdictional a9 The sending state lacks power to order the
receiving state to abandon its prosecution when IAD violations occur.'
By making the conditional promise to dismiss its charges, the receiving
state allows the prisoner, as a third party beneficiary5" to the contract
between the states, to enforce the LAD by seeking specific performance of
the contract.5
2
Many courts, including some reviewing habeas corpus petitions, have
H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 7401, 7416; see Speedy Triak Hearing on S. 754 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1973) (statement of
Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice); 120 Cong. Rec. 41,576
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Latta).
48. The LAD is mandatory as well on officials in the sending state. People v. Lincoln,
42 Colo. App. 512, 516, 601 P.2d 641, 644 (1979). If officials in the sending state violate
the LAD, the prisoner will be granted the same relief as if an official of the receiving state
had violated the IAD. See Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1973); People v.
Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 394, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90 (County Ct. 1960); Nelms v. State,
532 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (Tenn. 1976). Contra Shumate v. State, 449 So. 2d 387, 387 (Fla.
1984) (per curiam); cf. Bey v. State, 36 Md. App. 529, 531-34, 373 A.2d 1291, 1293-94
(Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (no relief under the Maryland version of the UMDDA when prison
officials err); King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652, 660, 249 A.2d 468, 473-74 (Ct. Spec. App.
1969) (same)
49. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 88 and accompanying text
51. The prisoner is classified either as a donee beneficiary to the contract, because the
IAD confers upon him, as a third party beneficiary, "a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the
beneficiary," Restatement of Contracts § 133 (1)(a) (1932); see also Marlboro Shirt Co. v.
American Dist. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 570, 77 A.2d 776, 778 (1951); A. Corbin, 4 Corbin
on Contracts § 774 (1951); 2 Williston on Contracts, supra note 45, § 357, at 842-43, or
as an intended beneficiary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 302 (1981); id. at 382
(introductory note to ch. 6). Regardless, the prisoner is vested with rights under the
IAD. See Williams v. Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Md. 1978). See infra note
52.
52. A third party to a contract may enforce that contract when it is made for his
benefit. See. e.g., Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U.S. 143, 149 (1876); Reliance Life Ins. Co. v.
Jaffe, 121 Cal. App. 2d 241, 244, 263 P.2d 82, 84 (1953); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y.
233, 237, 120 N.E. 639, 640, (1918); Restatement of Contracts § 135(a) (1932); 2 Willis-
ton on Contracts, supra note 45, § 347, at 792-95. Persons affected by interstate com-
pacts and treaties have been recognized to have the capacity to assert rights under them.
See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110-11 (1938)
(rejecting the assertion that the absence of New Mexico and Colorado, parties to the La
Plata River Compact, deprived the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the claim of an
affected private litigant); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 30 (1887) (title dispute affecting a
landowner involving the Georgia-Florida boundary under a treaty with Spain); United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 423-25 (1886) (violation of an extradition treaty be-
tween Great Britian and the United States asserted by the prisoner conveyed pursuant to
it); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 543 (1884) (Chinese citizen recognized as
beneficiary under a treaty between the United States and China, as modified by a subse-
quent Act of Congress); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 207-10 (1837) (dispute
over the Tennessee-Kentucky border; compact between the states "has full validity" and
is "obligatory upon the citizens of both states"); Some Legal and Practical Problems,
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held that prisoners waive the IAD dismissal provisions by failing to raise
them in timely fashion.13 These courts act under the mistaken impres-
sion that the IAD confers purely "statutory" rights. 4 Actually, as
noted above, the terms of the IAD are contractual as well as statutory. 5
The conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction constitute material parts of
the bargain between the states. "Waiver" of these conditions thus
amounts to a modification of the contract without consideration.56
Even assuming that modification of a contract without consideration is
supra note 38, at 329 (an individual can assert the protection of a compact that concerns
private rights).
The IAD obviously affects prisoners, seeking to reduce the uncertainty caused by de-
tainers. This uncertainty obstructs programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. 18
U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 1 (1982). If the prisoner were unable to enforce the IAD, its benefits
would be empty and illusory. Cf Filardo v. Foley Bros., 297 N.Y. 217, 221-22, 78
N.E.2d 480, 482 (1948) (laborers entitled to assert right to overtime pay under the Eight-
Hour Law, even though "the statute does not in so many words grant to the employee a
cause of action if such compensation is not received"), rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S.
281, 290-91 (1949).
Although stating that "principles of contract, evolving as they do from the commercial
world, are 'inapposite to the ends of criminal justice,' Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven
State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting United States ex rel. Selikoff v.
Commissioner of Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951
(1976)), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977), the Second Circuit has noted that "[w]here
appropriate, the courts have not hesitated to mandate specific performance of [plea bar-
gaining] agreement[s]." Id. at 297; cf Selikoff, 524 F.2d at 652, 654 (refusing to order
specific performance of plea bargain where the sentencing judge learned, prior to sentenc-
ing, of additional information that altered his opinion of the extent of the defendant's
culpability). The IAD, being an agreement reached among states, see supra note 2, that
itself is designed to advance the ends of criminal justice, see infra notes 126-34 and ac-
companying text, should be specifically performed.
The prisoner who has not engaged in any fraud upon the court needs to have the right
to enforce the IAD in his own behalf and on behalf of the sending state, because it is
possible that prosecutors in sending states will not act to protect either his rights or those
of the sending state, as determined by that state's legislature through its enactment of the
IAD. Cf Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Pa. 566, 573, 276 A.2d 834, 837-38 (1971) (rather
than enforcing the prisoner's rights under the UMDDA, the state argued that that statute
does not act automatically to divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction despite the stat-
ute's express language).
53. See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1981) (habeas
proceeding); Mars v. United States, 615 F.2d 704, 707 (6th Cir.) (alternate holding)
(habeas proceeding), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d
341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979) (direct appeal); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d
Cir.) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); Edwards v. United States, 564
F.2d 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (alternate holding) (habeas proceeding); Gray
v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-13 (D. Kan. 1978) (proceeding to vacate sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)), afl'dper curiam, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979); Johnson
v. State, 442 So. 2d 193, 196-97 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 963 (1984); People v. White, 33 A.D.2d 217, 221, 305 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (1969)
(direct appeal).
54. See supra cases cited in note 53.
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, § 11-36, at 448 (2d ed. 1977);
cf Rose v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (material
condition cannot be waived); 3A Corbin on Contracts, supra note 51, § 753, at 486
(same); Restatement of Contracts, § 297 & comment c (1932) (waiver of a material condi-
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ordinarily enforceable,5 7 the sending state has interests that are distinct
from those of the prisoner."8 The prisoner is powerless to affect the send-
ing state's interests by modifying the agreement between the states be-
cause he is not authorized by the IAD to act as the state's agent.59
Furthermore, "a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affect-
ing the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or
release contravenes the statutory policy."'6 The prisoner is accorded the
right to an "expeditious and orderly" trial under the IAD6' to further the
public interest that "detainers. . . not hamper the administration of cor-
rection programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals."62 The
general public, judges, corrections officials and parole authorities in the
sending state, as well as the prisoner, all share this interest.63 To allow
tion "involves to so great a degree a new undertaking that the requisites for the creation
of a new contract must exist").
57. An election to continue performance, manifested by conduct, requires no consid-
eration. See Brede v. Rosedale Terrace Co., 216 N.Y. 246, 249, 110 N.E. 430,431 (1915);
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 56, § 11-37 at 450-51; Restatement of Contracts § 309
(1932). Additionally, although the Restatement states that modification of a material
condition is not enforceable unless the parties create a new contract, see Restatement of
Contracts § 297 comment c (1932), the position of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
is that such a modification is binding (among other reasons, that are inapplicable to this
situation) "to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of
position in reliance on the promise." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(c) (1981).
58. Officials in the sending state can carry out their duties when the uncertainty pro-
duced by detainers is eliminated. See infra note 63.
59. The only time waiver is mentioned in the IAD is in reference to the fact that,
when the prisoner requests disposition of the detainer under art. III, the prisoner agrees
to waive extradition to the receiving state. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 111(e) (1982).
Otherwise, he is powerless to modify the IAD. Cf. Exparte Coy, 32 F. 911, 917 (W.D.
Tex. 1887) (prisoner cannot waive provisions of an extradition treaty because he is a third
party to the contract).
60. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704, 706-07 (1945) (no waiver al-
lowed of rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1962 (1985) (same; purposes of the FLSA
"require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections"); McDonald
v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 n.12 (1984) (no waiver of right to judicial action under
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51
(1974) (refusing to allow individual to waive cause of action conferred by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act because to do so "would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII"); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953) (refusing to allow inves-
tor to waive "judicial trial and review" of claim under the Securities Act of 1933 against a
securities brokerage firm); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492,
1505 (D.N.J. 1985) (rights granted by § 510 of ERISA are unwaivable; even assuming
identity of the individual employees with the union, waiver is "neither statutorily permis-
sible nor logically possible").
61. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982).
62. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 75. As it existed before
the IAD, the detainer system actually increased the costs, economic and otherwise, of
incarceration. See id at 74.
63. Uncertainty produced by the imposition of detainers affects all of the participants
in the correctional process. The prisoner subject to a detainer is likely to be unmotivated
to rehabilitate himself because of the possibility that he faces another prison term. See
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (quoting Council of State Govern-
ments-1956, supra note 1, at 74); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379 (1969) (quoting
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prisoners to waive or release deficient prosecutions would thwart the leg-
islative policy that the IAD was designed to effectuate. 64
Bennett II, supra note 12, at 21); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830,
837 (3d Cir. 1975) ("the psychological strain resulting from uncertainty about any future
sentence decreases an inmate's desire to take advantage of institutional opportunites");
116 Cong. Rec. 14,000 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("This. .. consideration is espe-
cially important in view of the fact that the basic purpose of the entire penal system is to
prepare its inmates to reenter society as law-abiding citizens."). Judges may be unsure of
the appropriate length of sentence they should impose when the individuals before them
may face further prosecution. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at
74; Perry, Effect of Detainers on Sentencing Policies, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at
11, 11-12. Prison officials may be uncertain how to plan and structure the prisoner's
rehabilitation program. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 74; see
also Bennett I, supra note 12, at 9 ("because of the indefinite character of many detainers
the institutional staff is in no better position to know what the future holds for these men
than are the men themselves") (pre-IAD statement). Parole boards are also affected by
the uncertainty created by the filing of a detainer. See Bennett I, supra note 12, at 9-10
(noting the "well-established policy" of the Federal Board of Parole, held in common
with many state boards of parole, to refuse parole to prisoners subject to detainers) (pre-
IAD statement); id. at 10 (detainers serve to undermine parole, "one of the most impor-
tant aspects of the modem correctional program"). See supra note 12.
A stated goal of the IAD is "to permit the prisoner to secure a greater degree of knowl-
edge of his own future and to make it possible for the prison authorities to provide better
plans and programs for his treatment." Council of State Governments-1956, supra note
1, at 76-77; see Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3413 n.6 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("The [IAD] obviously does not eliminate detainers, but merely provides the means
for definitive resolution and imposition of a certain, final sentence."); Mauro, 436 U.S. at
360 (IAD is intended to alleviate the harmful effects of detainers by encouraging quicker
resolution of the outstanding charges); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (para-
phrasing the language used by the Council of State Governments), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4865 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1970) (same). Thus, the IAD creates rights in all of the participants in the rehabilitative
process. See United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975)
(the sending state's right "not to have its. . . rehabilitative programs unduly hampered"
was violated by the same actions that violated the prisoner's rights to a speedy trial and
effective rehabilitative treatment).
The protection provided by the IAD often has been confused with the right to speedy
trial. See infra note 103. The right to speedy trial is personal to a defendant, and is
waivable. See American Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, § 4.1, at 41 commentary (Approved Draft, 1968)
(right to speedy trial "is a personal right of the defendant, and thus the right is deemed
waived if not properly asserted") (emphasis added). The protection offered to the pris-
oner is not personal to him because the IAD creates rights in people beside the prisoner.
See Groomes, 520 F.2d at 835. Courts, however, have misconstrued the IAD, stating that
the rights granted by it are personal to the prisoner. See United States v. Eaddy, 595
F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329, 336 n.9 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979); United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977),
ajfd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). These
courts fail to recognize that the IAD reflects different policies than the Speedy Trial Act.
See infra note 103.
64. Cf. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 n. 12 (1984) (Court refuses to
allow waiver "because preclusion of a judicial action would gravely undermine the effec-
tiveness of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983"); Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)
(Fair Labor Standards Act).
The public interest represented by the IAD, see supra notes 62-63, and infra notes 126-
33, overrides any desire of the prisoner to act contrarily to its provisions. Cf. Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1982) (refusing to enforce contract violating both
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The position that IAD violations are not subject to waiver comports
with the position of this Note that IAD violations divest courts of subject
matter jurisdiction.65 The parties to the litigation may not waive the defi-
the Sherman Act and the Taft-Hartley Act "only on account of the public interest")
(quoting McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669 (1899)).
65. Because the IAD is a compact, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, the party
states are free to establish jurisdictional limits. These limits need not be absolute. Thus,
the time limitations of the IAD may be extended without triggering the duty to impose its
sanctions. "[F]or good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c) (1982). Courts have disagreed on
the meaning of "continuance". Compare State v. Lippolis, 55 NJ. 354, 354, 262 A.2d
203, 203 (1970) (per curiam) (unanimously reversing the Appellate Division, which held
that a continuance must be obtained "no later than the expiration of the [applicable time
limitation]", State v. Lippolis, 107 NJ. Super. 137, 143, 257 A.2d 705, 709 (App. Div.
1969)), with Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106-07, 301 A.2d 605, 606-07 (1973)
(rejecting the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State Y. Lippolis explicitly).
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lippolis rests on untenable rationale.
First, the IAD itself is self-executing. See supra note 17. Second, Judge Kolovsky, whose
dissent in the Appellate Division was unanimously adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, see Lippolis, 55 N.J. at 354, 262 A.2d at 203, stated that the time in which the
receiving state can obtain a continuance must extend beyond the last day of the IAD's
time limitation because the IAD is not self-executing. Lippolis, 107 NJ. Super. at 147,
257 A.2d at 711 (Kolovsky, J., dissenting). Yet the UMDDA, which was drafted concur-
rently by the same body that drafted the IAD, the Council of State Governments, see
Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 77-85, contains the same language
as the IAD regarding the granting of "any necessary or reasonable continuance." See id.
at 77 (UMDDA § 1(a)); id at 81 (AD art. III(a)); id at 83 (LAD art. IV(c)). These
similar provisions, drafted by the same legislative group at the same time, see Council of
State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 76-85, should be construed to operate simi-
larly. This is a guideline of statutory construction that has been applied to the UMDDA
and the IAD. See People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 374-75, 619 P.2d 72, 73-74 (1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Barnes v. State, 20 Md. App.
262, 268, 315 A.2d 117, 121 (Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd, 273 Md. 195, 328 A.2d 737 (1974);
State ex reL Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). Whether the
IAD provision is self-executing is irrelevant. Just as it is impossible to obtain a continu-
ance after the expiration of the time period in the UMDDA, see Commonwealth v.
Klimeck, 416 Pa. 434, 436-37, 206 A.2d 381, 382 (1965), it should also be impossible to
obtain a continuance after the expiration of the IAD time period.
Courts have disagreed on what constitutes "reasonable" grounds for a continuance.
Compare United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1977) (ifjudge cannot hold
trial within the time limit, "it is [his] responsibility. . . to reassign" the case), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) with Foran v. Metz, 463 F. Supp. 1088,
1097-98 (S.D.N.Y.) (continuance granted so prosecutor could take a three-week vaca-
tion), afl'd mem., 603 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979) and State v.
Carpenter, 24 Wash. App. 41, 47, 599 P.2d 1, 4 (1979) (any delay that occurs after the
defendant requests a continuance is attributable to him).
A benefit of a strict interpretation of the IAD's time limitations is a greater reluctance
on the part of courts to countenance delay. Eg., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102,
105-07, 301 A.2d 605, 606-08 (1973) (charges dismissed when state dilatorily moved for a
continuance one day after expiration of the time limit). This advances the goal of the
IAD to dispose of detainers in an "expeditious and orderly" manner, see 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 2, art. I (1982), and gives the sending state the greatest degree of control over its pris-
oner. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. In light of the policies that the IAD
reflects, it is unlikely that a prosecutor's vacation is a reasonable ground for delay in
prosecution.
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ciency of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 6
II. LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Analysis of the IAD's language67 and legislative history reveals the
intent that violations of its provisions mandatorily and automatically 68
divest receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction. The receiving state
promises the sending state that it "shall" dispose of its detainer(s) in the
agreed fashion,69 and, if it violates the compact's procedures, the appro-
priate court of the receiving state "shall enter an order dismissing" the
indictment, information or complaint "with prejudice."'70 The Council
of State Governments, which formulated the IAD, appears to have cho-
sen the word "shall" intentionally. 71 "Shall" is usually a word of man-
date rather than of discretion.72 Mandatory compliance with the
66. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 (1966); United States v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 226, 229 (1938); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Smith v. Spina, 477
F.2d 1140, 1145 (3d Cir. 1973).
67. The IAD was drafted with reference to and was intended to be analyzed in light
of the entire body of legal principles applicable to the interpretation of statutes. Cf. Zim-
mermann & Wendell, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that all compacts are drafted with these
principles in mind).
68. There is a distinction between "mandatory" and "automatic". If a defendant may
waive the violation, any required consequences are mandatory only after he asserts the
violation. Thus, the consequences are not automatically imposed. See text accompany-
ing infra notes 110-12.
69. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(a), IV(c) (1982).
70. See id. arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982). In addition, if the prisoner is in the receiv-
ing state after that state violates the applicable time limit, the receiving state promises
that its "detainer based [on the charges underlying the detainer] shall cease to be of any
force or effect." IAD art. V(c). See supra note 44.
71. The Council of State Governments initially proposed the IAD in 1956. See supra
note 1. The Council intended that the IAD be analyzed according to the principles of
statutory construction. See supra note 67. The word "shall" is normally used to indicate
that the delineated action is mandatory. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. The
Council itself later described the provisions of the IAD as "mandatory." See infra notes
74, 95 and accompanying text. Finally, when the Council drafted its own speedy trial
legislation, it used the word "may," indicating that that statute, in contrast to the IAD,
grants discretionary power to courts. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295
U.S. 490, 493 (1935); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860); City of
Edmonds v. United States Dep't of Labor, 749 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984).
Some cases have refused to hold that statutes directing administrative action within a
statutory time period and using the word "shall" are in fact mandatory unless the statute
"both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period
and specifies a consequence for failurd to comply with the provision." St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Brock, 769 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fort Worth
Nat'l Corp. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47, 58 (5th Cir. 1972)), petition
for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1985) (No. 85-949); see Thomas v. Barry,
729 F.2d 1469, 1470 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ward v. Fremont Unified School Dist., 276
Cal. Ap. 2d 313, 322, 80 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1969); State ex rel. Taylor v. Wade, 360
Mo. 895, 899, 231 S.W.2d 179, 181 (1950) (en banc). The IAD does include conse-
quences for a failure to comply with its provisions. See supra note 15.
Of course, construction of a statute must ultimately rest on legislative intent. See Es-
coe, 295 U.S. at 493-94; United Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453
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provisions of the IAD advances the intent of its drafters that receiving
states dispose of detainers in an "expeditious and orderly" fashion."3 The
Council itself later described the procedure as "mandatory. 74
The drafters' inclusion of penalties for noncompliance supplies further
evidence that the provisions of the IAD are mandatory.7- The LAD does
include penalties---dismissal of the outstanding charges with prejudice
and, when the prisoner remains in the receiving state after the occurrence
of the violation, nullification of the "force and effect" of the detainer.76
These sanctions apply if the receiving state fails to comply with the
IAD's time limits and its anti-shuttling provisions.77
Moreover, the procedures enacted in the IAD embody the substance of
the receiving state's duty to dispose of its detainers in an "expeditious
and orderly" fashion. The procedures under which the prisoner is to be
prosecuted form the subject matter of the IAD; they are matters of sub-
stance. They represent a determination of what constitutes an "expedi-
tious and orderly" disposition by the receiving state.7' Thus, application
of another guideline of statutory construction, that provisions relating to
the subject matter of the statute are mandatory,79 further demonstrates
that the IAD's provisions are mandatory and automatic.
(4th Cir. 1985); Katunich v. Donovan, 594 F. Supp. 744, 749 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
Construction of the LAD as containing mandatory provisions advances the legislative
intent of its drafters. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
73. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 1 (1982) (statement of purpose).
74. Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1958, at
17 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Council of State Governments-1957].
75. See supra note 72.
76. See supra note 15.
77. See supra note 15.
78. Many courts have dismissed the LAD as nothing more than a set of "procedural
rules." Eg., United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979); Camp v. United
States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); Derring v. State, 273 Ark. 347, 351, 619 S.W.2d
644, 646 (1981); see Gray v. Benson, 458 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (D. Kan. 1978) (specifically
referring to IAD art. IV(e)), affd per curiam, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979); cf. State v.
Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. 30, 34-35, 383 A.2d 437, 438-39 (App. Div.) (referring to de-
fendants' ground of appeal, violation of TAD art. 111(a), as merely a procedural defect in
the prosecution), certification denied, 77 N.J. 479, 391 A.2d 494 (1978). This attitude
conforms with a characterization of the TAD's provisions as conferring purely "statu-
tory" rights. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. But see Silver v. Mohasco Corp.,
602 F.2d 1083, 1095 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dissenting in part) ("where, as here, a
procedural requirement does further a substantive purpose, it is judicial disregard of the
statutory design that is inappropriate") (emphasis in original), rev'd, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
However, the right of a state to prosecute a prisoner protected by the IAD is conditional.
Failure to comply with these rules is fatal to the prosecution. See infra note 80 and
accompanying text. See 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 393, 401 (1979) ("[p]rocedural violations [of
the IAD] are not mere technical defects").
79. See Katunich v. Donovan, 594 F. Supp. 744, 749 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (dictum);
Joanna W. Mills Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (U.S. Cust. Ct. 1970);
Bowen v. Minneapolis, 47 Minn. 115, 117, 49 N.W. 683, 683 (1891); Crawford, Construc-
tion of Statutes § 72, at 104 (1940); cf People ex reL Agnew v. Graham, 267 III. 426, 438,
108 N.E. 699, 704 (1915) (a statute will be considered mandatory if it creates duties that
"affect the real merits" of the subject of the legislation).
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Another guideline of statutory construction states that the placement
of conditions on a statutory right within the statute itself acts to destroy
that right when the conditions have not been met. 0 The IAD creates a
right in the receiving state-the right to extend its personal jurisdiction
extraterritorially and to obtain a prisoner from another state so that it
may prosecute him."' The IAD restricts the exercise of this right as it
creates it, imposing time limits and a prohibition of multiple transfers on
the receiving state. This adds support to the contention that failure to
comply with the provisions of the IAD acts to divest courts in receiving
states of the right to prosecute the prisoner.
Finally, the conclusion that the provisions of the IAD are mandatory
and automatic comports completely with the intent of its drafters. Of
necessity," the Council simultaneously proposed two acts to deal with
the problem of detainers. One, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
Detainers Act (UMDDA), concerned itself with the disposition of intra-
state detainers. s3 The other, the IAD, governed interstate detainers.
84
The UMDDA expressly divested courts of subject matter jurisdiction
over the outstanding charges when the enacting state failed to bring the
prisoner to trial within the time limits provided in the act. 5 The IAD
did not expressly compel the same result, but its drafters stated that
"[tjhe [Interstate] Agreement on Detainers applies the same principles
embodied in the intrastate act to the interstate field."18 6
The reason that the IAD does not expressly compel divestiture of sub-
80. See, e.g., Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926); Willaim Danzer & Co. v.
Gulf& Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1925); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214
(1886). The Supreme Court has stated that the lapsing of a statute of limitations con-
tained in a statute, a condition on the statutory right created, is jurisdictional, limiting the
power of the adjudicatory body. See United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC,
246 U.S. 638, 642 (1918); see also Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320
U.S. 356, 363-65 (1943) (citing Louisville Cement Co. with approval); cf Mohasco Corp.
v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811-13, 826 (1980) (reinstating the decision of the district court
that an employee's failure to comply with a filing deadline deprived it of subject matter
jurisdiction).
81. The use of a compact to extend jurisdiction extraterritorially was first demon-
strated in the New York-New Jersey Compact ("Treaty") of 1834, "which extended the
criminal jurisdiction of each party state over particular water areas beyond the actual
boundary line." Zimmermann & Wendell, supra note 39, at 41; see 1 The Port of New
York Authority, The Port of New York Authority Treaties and Statutes 4-6 (1948); cf
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1006 Interpleader Compact (McKinney 1976) (extending personal
jurisdiction extraterritorially).
82. See infra text at notes 87-91.
83. Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 76.
84. Id. at 78.
85. In the event that the action is not brought to trial within the period of time
as herein provided, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction
thereof, nor shall the untried [indictment, information or complaint] be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same
with prejudice.
Id. (brackets in original).
86. Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 78.
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ject matter jurisdiction is that it is "interjurisdictional. '8 The drafters
were limited by the principle that a state cannot constitutionally enact
legislation that compels another state to act.88 The Council of State Gov-
ernments nevertheless desired that the IAD operate as the "interjurisdic-
tional counterpart" of the UMDDA.19 Since the Council desired to
apply the same principles embodied in the UMDDA to the IAD,9° it
follows that it intended to impose the same harsh penalty found in the
UMDDA-withdrawal of subject matter jurisdiction-though the draft-
ers were limited by the interjurisdictional nature of the compact.91
87. See id
88. Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) ("Legislation is presumptively
territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction.");
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (normally a statute
will be construed "as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power"); Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 97 (1823) (opinion on rehearing) (it would be absurd to believe one
state could enact a law obligatory upon another state); see United States v. Bryant, 612
F.2d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1979) ("as originally drafted for application only among the sev-
eral states of the Union, the [IAD] must have contemplated 'separate geographic and
distinct jurisdictional units' when it used the term 'State' "), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920
(1980); United States v. Umbower, 602 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Being designed
for adoption by state legislatures, the [IAD] contemplates independent and geographi-
cally distinct sovereign state units."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980); cf. Heath v.
Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 438 (1985) ("[t]he States are equal to each other 'in power,
dignity and authority' ") (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (Illinois anti-takeover statute struck down
because of its "extraterritorial effect").
This limitation of power affets various aspects of the detainer system. Detainers, by
themselves, lack legal force. Hincks, supra note 41, at 3; see Yackle, Taking Stock of
Detainer Statutes, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 88, 96-97 (1975) ("one state has no power to com-
pel another state to deliver up a prison inmate for prosecution"); cf State v. Fender, 268
S.E.2d 120, 123 (1980) (although a state may deliver a writ of habeas corpus to another
state, "the seeking state cannot compel the jurisdiction having custody to return the ac-
cused for trial"). Even under the IAD, the contracting states "cooperat[e]," see 18
U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982), so that a court in the sending state may not directly affect
the outstanding charges in the receiving state. Narel v. Liburdi, 185 Conn. 562, 570, 441
A.2d 177, 182 (1981) (in action based on the IAD, the "court [of the sending state],
lacking extraterritorial jurisdiction, is powerless to dismiss the underlying charge [of the
receiving state]"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); accord Gayles v. Hedman, 309 Minn.
289, 291, 244 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (1976); State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 387, 191
A.2d 758, 762 (App. Div. 1963); People ex reL Albuequrque v. Ward, 116 Misc. 2d 634,
635, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
89. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 78. Although the
phrase "interjurisdictional counterpart" refers only to IAD art. III, by which a prisoner
can request disposition of the detainer, see icL, this is so because there is no counterpart in
the UMDDA to IAD art. IV, which is an extradition agreement. Since the penalties
imposed for violation of either IAD art. III or IAD art. IV are the same, see 18 U.S.C.
app. § 2, arts. III(d), IV(e), V(c) (1982), the effect of the entire IAD should be to act as
the "interjurisdictional counterpart" of the UMDDA.
90. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
91. Seesupra text at notes 82-89. But see Yackle, supra note 88, at 101 n.76 (since the
language of the IAD does not mirror that of the UMDDA, "apparently the prisoner
must move for dismissal"). The analysis in that footnote rests on the flawed analysis of
State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 387, 191 A.2d 758, 763 (App. Div. 1963). The West
case is discussed supra at note 17.
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The Council acted under the belief that delay in prosecution of charges
underlying detainers harmed the sending state's rehabilitation program.92
The IAD provides the sending state with the means of minimizing that
delay. The sending state retains the greatest amount of control over its
prisoner93 through mandatory and automatic IAD provisions.
One extrinsic aid adds to our understanding of the intent of the Coun-
cil of State Governments when it formulated the IAD. One year after
proposing the IAD, the Council proposed speedy trial legislation.94 In
its prefatory comments to that legislation, the Council referred to the
IAD, and its "mandatory" provisions. 95 In contrast to the IAD, the
Council's speedy trial legislation grants discretionary power to the
court.96 Further, the speedy trial legislation provides that the defendant
must move for dismissal to secure the right.97 These differences under-
score the mandatory nature of the IAD requirements.
III. DETERMINING CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE
IAD's PROVISIONS
In 1970, Congress adopted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers on
behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia.98 Congress'
understanding of the provisions of the IAD is indicative of the under-
standing other parties had of its terms. Moreover, the IAD is "a federal
law subject to federal construction." 99
The legislative history of the IAD gives no indication that the severity
of the penalties for noncompliance was debated.'0 The bill joining the
92. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1982); see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S.
340, 359-60 (1978); State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 355-56 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc).
93. Under the IAD, "(flor all purposes other than (for the disposition of the receiving
state's charges underlying its detainer], the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the
custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending State ... " 18 U.S.C. app. § 2,
art. V(g) (1982).
94. See Council of State Governments-1957, supra note 74, at 17-18.
95. See id. at 17.
96. On the defendant's application, the court "may" dismiss the charges. Id. at 18.
Under principles of statutory construction, "may" ordinarily indicates that discretion
exists. See, e.g., United Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453 (4th Cir.
1985) (dictum); Matzke v. Block, 732 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1984); City of Newark v.
Blumenthal, 457 F. Supp. 30, 32 (D.D.C. 1978).
97. Council of State Governments-1957, supra note 74, at 18. Section 2 would allow
the court to dismiss the charges sua sponte, see id., or on application of the prosecutor, see
id., but practically speaking the burden of vigilance would lie with the defendant.
98. See supra note 3.
99. Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403 (1985); see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981). Therefore, congressional understanding of the IAD is important
in and of itself as an indicator of what this federal law demands. The Supreme Court has
looked to discern the legislative intent of Congress in each of its decisions construing the
IAD. See Carchman, 105 S. Ct. at 3408; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. at 448-49; United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 353-56 (1978).
100. See generally 116 Cong. Rec. 13,997-14,000 (1970) (proceedings in the House of
Representatives); id at 38,840-38,842 (proceedings in the Senate).
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United States and the District of Columbia as parties to the IAD passed
without opposition.00 Thus, there is no direct evidence of Congress' un-
derstanding of the IAD. However, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
(STA)10 2 provides an extrinsic aid in determining the congressional un-
derstanding of the harsh nature of the IAD's sanctions. Like the LAD,
the STA is intended to produce quicker resolution of outstanding crimi-
nal charges. 103 Furthermore, the STA, like the IAD, contains the sanc-
101. See 116 Cong. Rec. 14,000 (1970) (House of Representatives); id. at 38,84041
(Senate).
102. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161-3174 (1982)).
103. Both the IAD and the STA contain time limits within which the defendant must
be brought to trial. Compare 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III(a) (1982) (prisoner must be
brought to trial within 180 days of delivery of his request for disposition of the detainer to
the appropriate authorities of the receiving state) and 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(c)
(1982) (prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving
state) with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c) (1982) (defendant must be brought to trial within 100
days of arrest or service of summons). However, the LAD is not speedy trial legislation.
Its speedy trial provisions are merely measures designed to effectuate the goal of the
Council of State Governments to reduce the anti-rehabilitative effect of long-standing
detainers. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 75 (objective to be
achieved is "that detainers will not hamper the administration of correction programs
and the effective rehabilitation of criminals"); see also Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878, 882
(3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Carchman v. Nash, 105 S CL 3401
(1985); People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 392, 201 N. Y.S.2d 83, 88 (County Ct. 1960);
Bennett I, supra note 12, at 10; Meyer, Effective Utilization of Criminal Detainer Proce-
dures, 61 Iowa L. Rev. 659, 674 (1976); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and
the New Detainer Statutes, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 828, 855-56 (1964); Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum, supra note 6, at 298-99 (1979); Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial
For Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 Yale L.J. 767, 775 (1968). The emphasis of the
LAD on reducing harm to the sending state's rehabilitation program is hinted at by the
roster of participants who reviewed proposals for the disposition of detainers, which
included:
representatives of such groups as the state police, prison societies and correc-
tional associations, bar associations, state legislators, members of commissions
on interstate cooperation, state and local parole and probation officials, district
attorneys, state correctional andprison officials, states attorneys general, and the
United States Department of Justice.
Bennett II, supra note 12, at 22 (emphasis added); see United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S.
340, 350 & n.17 (1978); Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Pro-
gram for 1959, at 167 (1958); Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New De-
tainer Statutes, supra, at 855 n.225.
In Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), and Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), the
Supreme Court held that prisoners are entitled to a speedy trial. Dickey, 398 U.S. at 32,
37-38; Hooey, 393 U.S. at 375, 383. Congress passed the IAD in response to these deci-
sions. See Carchman v. Nash, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3409 n.10 (1985); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4864, 4864; H.R. Rep.
No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 14,000 (1970) (remarks
of Rep. Poff) (noting Hooey); id. at 38,840 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (same). Although
"the real impetus for enactment of the [IAD]" may have been "the possibility of dismis-
sal of state cases" after Hooey and Dickey, Fried, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and the Federal Government, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 493, 501 (1978), Congress did not have
the power to convert the LAD into speedy trial legislation unilaterally. See Carchman,
105 S. Ct. at 3418-19 n. 18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note
38. Congress intended to preserve prisoners' rights to a speedy trial by passing the lAD;
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tion of dismissal of prosecutions for violations of its requirements.'0
The legislative history of the STA reveals Congress' understanding of
nonetheless, the legislators realized that with passage they were also incorporating the
IAD's primary goal, the reduction of uncertainty to prisoners' terms of incarceration.
See 116 Cong. Rec. 38,842 (1970); id. at 13,999.
One of the reasons courts have not policed IAD time limitation violations strictly is
that they perceive the prisoners to be raising "speedy trial-type arguments." See United
States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 770 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 828 (1986); Foran v. Metz, 463 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mern.,
603 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979); Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d
193, 196-97 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984); Hunter v. Franza,
405 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam); Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 262 Pa. Super. 211, 217, 396 A.2d 720, 723 (1978). The association of the
IAD with the STA leads courts to accept the argument that the prisoner has waived his
rights, since speedy trial rights are subject to waiver. See Duckworth, 770 F.2d at 692;
Johnson, 442 So. 2d at 196; Franza, 405 So. 2d at 1036-37; Thompson, 262 Pa. Super. at
217, 396 A.2d at 723.
Congress contributed to the confusion of the statutes by incorporating § 31610) into
the STA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161() (1982). This section is intended to extend "the right to
a speedy trial to prisoners." See H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7427. In Mauro, the Supreme Court added to
the confusion when it stated that if the different time limitations contained in the STA
and the IAD are both applicable to a particular prosecution, "the more stringent limita-
tion may simply be applied." See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 357 n.24 (dictum). This language is
problematic. If it refers to the shorter time period of the two, then a prisoner and his
sending state will be denied the benefit of dismissal with prejudice contained in the IAD,
because the STA grants the court discretion to order dismissal without prejudice. See
infra text at note 115.
The potential problem is resolved by applying the guideline of statutory construction
that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies." Block v.
North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 285 (1983); see also Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1979); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820,
834 (1976). The IAD applies only to prisoners, while the STA applies to all criminal
defendants.
In a case where a prisoner asserted rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) in conjunction with a petition seeking habeas corpus relief, the Court
stated that only the "more specific act," habeas corpus, should apply, for "strong policy"
reasons. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973). Similarly, there are
strong policy reasons why the IAD should be applied rather than the STA when both are
available. First, the two statutes protect different rights. The STA is intended to enforce
the constitutional right to speedy trial, see H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7402, while the IAD has the goal of
advancing prisoner rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 1 (1982). Second, the STA
has the objective of assisting "in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring
speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial,"
see H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 7401, 7401, while the IAD's objective is to remove detainers as a hindrance to "the
administration of correction programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals." See
Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 75. Third, the concern of Con-
gress that dismissals with prejudice under the STA would return some malefactors to
society unrehabilitated, see infra note 123 and accompanying text, is not applicable to
prisoners being prosecuted in receiving states under the IAD because they will be re-
turned to their original correctional facility in the sending state if the prosecution is dis-
missed. See infra text accompanying note 122; see also 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III(d),
IV(e), V(g) (1982).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
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both the IAD'S manner of operation and the severity of its sanctions
through the legislators' debates over the dismissal provisions contained
in the STA.
The STA was originally introduced in the Senate on June 9, 1970,10°
and in the House of Representatives on September 9, 1970.116 The LAD
was enacted on November 25, 1970.107 Thus, Congress became aware of
the STA prior to passing the IAD. The original version of the STA pro-
vided the same sanction for STA violations as the IAD provided-dis-
missal of the charges with prejudice.' 08 There were, however, two
important limitations on the use of the sanction: 1) the STA expressly
required the defendant to move for dismissal, and 2) failure by the de-
fendant to move for dismissal before trial constituted waiver of the right
to dismissal. 10 9
Section 3162(a)(2) of the STA states that under certain conditions "the
information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defend-
ant." 110 There is no doubt that dismissal is mandatory in these situa-
tions."' However, dismissal is not "automatic, since the defendant is
expressly required under section 3162(a)(2) to move for dismissal if not
brought to trial within the prescribed time.""' 2 During hearings on the
STA, Senator Percy argued against conditioning dismissal on a motion
by the defendant:
If, after [the applicable time period within the bill] has expired, the
accused has not been brought to trial, despite the readiness of the de-
fense and the court, and no good cause has been shown for the delay,
the charges should be automatically dropped. The defendant should
not have to move the court to have the charges dismissed; it should be
the automatic result of the denial of a basic right." 13
105. See S. 3936, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 18,844 (1970).
106. See H.R. 19,067, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 30,927 (1970).
107. On that date the Senate passed the IAD. See 116 Cong. Rec. 38,84042 (1970).
108. See 116 Cong. Rec. 18,846 (1970) (S. 3936). This sanction was retained when the
STA was reintroduced by Sen. Ervin the following year. See Speedy Trial. Hearings on
S. 895 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 232 [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S 895]; 117 Cong. Rec.
3408 (1971). Introducing S. 895, Sen. Ervin remarked that it was almost exactly the
same bill as its predecessor. "The only real difference in [S. 895] and S. 3936 which was
introduced last year is that the new bill does not provide for specific additional penalties
for crimes committed while a defendant was released awaiting trial." 117 Cong. Rec.
3407 (1971).
109. See 117 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1971).
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). This language mirrors the
language in S. 895. See Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 232; 117 Cong. Rec. 3408
(1971).
111. H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7401, 7431; see also United States v. Ford, 532 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D.D.C.
1981) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1508).
112. H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7401, 7431 (emphasis in original).
113. Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 67 (statement of Sen. Percy).
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Since the IAD and the STA employ similar language, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress understood the IAD penalty to be mandatory.
Furthermore, since the IAD, unlike the STA, contains no requirement
that the defendant move for dismissal, Congress must have understood
the IAD sanction to be automatic. Consistent with this distinction, the
IAD does not contain language permitting waiver of the right to
mandatory dismissal, indicating that none is possible. 14
Congress clearly understood that dismissal with prejudice is a very
harsh sanction. The STA had to be amended to vest the trial court with
discretion to order dismissal with or without prejudice before the bill
could be passed." 5 Senator Ervin, principal sponsor of the bill, stated:
"[O]n the Senate side opposition to this dismissal with prejudice provi-
sion was so intense that passage would have been impossible [unless it
were changed]."'16
The Justice Department, as an interested party, commented to Con-
gress on both the IAD and the STA. 117 The Department's position re-
garding dismissal is enlightening. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights about the original
sanction of dismissal with prejudice contained in the early versions of the
STA, then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist stated:
[I]t may well be, Mr. Chairman, that the whole system of Federal
114. See supra note 59.
115. 120 Cong. Rec. 41,794-96 (1974); see id. at 41,578 (remarks of Rep. Conyers)
(noting that the House Subcommittee on Crime was ready to "yield" to the "pressures"
for the amendment); id. at 41,778 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) ("I understand that an
amendment will be offered by the committee to remove the mandatory dismissal with
prejudice and immunity language, and providing for a dismissal with or without preju-
dice as the court finds to be appropriate. This amendment must be adopted if the bill is to
pass."); id. at 41,576 (remarks of Rep. Latta) (opining that unless the dismissal sanction
were modified, the STA "should be referred to as the 'Let the Criminal Go Act of
1974' "); id. at 41,577 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (voicing support for the proposed
amendment of the dismissal sanction to be offered by Rep. Cohen); id. at 41,578 (remarks
of Rep. Wiggins) (if the amendment allowing dismissal without prejudice were adopted,
"90 percent of the legitimate objection to the bill will have been resolved"); id. at 41,794
(remarks of Rep. Conyers) (explaining, after the offer of the amendment, that because of
time pressure to recess, "it would be far more prudent for all of us, regardless of our
feelings about this amendment, to accede to it in the interests of enacting speedy trial
legislation").
116. Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658,
H.R. 687, H.R. 773 and H.R. 4807 Before the House of Representatives Subcomm. on
Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Ervin) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Speedy Trial Act of 1974]; see also 120 Cong. Rec.
35,871 (1974).
117. See Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 94-121 (statement of W.H. Rehnquist,
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (comments on the STA); Speedy Trial:
Hearing on S. 754 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 109-31 (1973) (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attor-
ney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (same); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4864, 4868-69 (letter from R. Klein-
dienst, Deputy Attorney General, regarding the need for federal adoption of the TAD);
H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970) (same).
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criminal justice needs to be shaken by the scruff of its neck, and
brought up short with a relatively peremptory instruction to prosecu-
tors, defense counsel, and judges alike that criminal cases must be tried
within a particular period of time. That is certainly the import of the
mandatory dismissal provisions of your bill. 18
The Department initially supported the sanction of dismissal with preju-
dice, but its support was contingent on enactment by Congress of new
restrictions on the use of the writ of habeas corpus." 9 Failing to con-
vince Congress to reform the habeas corpus laws, the Department re-
quested that Congress modify the sanction provided in the STA, out of
"fear [of] wholesale dismissals in jurisdictions with overloaded criminal
calendars."' 2 In contrast, the Justice Department urged passage of the
IAD, expressing no reservations as to its sanctions.' 2 ' Because LAD de-
fendants are already incarcerated, dismissals under the IAD would not
release alleged criminals to society.' 22 The possibility that such releases
would occur was a real fear of Congress when it considered the STA.11
Thus, it appears that Congress passed the IAD with the knowledge that
118. Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 96 (emphasis added); see also 120 Cong.
Rec. 41,780 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (quoting the testimony of Assistant Attor-
ney General Rehnquist).
119. See Hearings on S. 895, supra note 108, at 97-106, 108-14 (statement of W.H.
Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
120. See 120 Cong. Rec. 35,965 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Conyers); see also Hearings
Speedy TrialAct of 1974, supra note 116, at 387 (statement of Rep. Rodino, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Comm.) (the effect of the sanction was "lessened" "[a]t the insistence
of the Department of Justice"); 120 Cong. Rec. at 35,873 (same); Speedy Trial: Hearing
on S. 754 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-12 (1973) (statement of J. T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (expressing the fear that the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice imposes too great a cost on society).
121. See S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (letter from R. Kleindienst, Deputy
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Rep. Celler, Chairman of the House of Repre-
sentatives Comm. oli the Judiciary), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4864, 4868-69; H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970) (same). The letter
specifically discusses the conditions of transfer, see S. Rep. No. 1356, supra, at 5, re-
printed in 1970 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4864, 4868; H.R. Rep. No. 1018, supra, at
5, indicating that the Justice Dep't was aware that the IAD includes the sanction of
dismissal with prejudice, since that sanction is included in the relevant sections of the
IAD. See supra note 15.
122. See Hoss v. State, 266 Md. 136, 148, 292 A.2d 48, 54 (1972) (while dismissing
kidnapping charges, court notes that its decision "is not likely to expedite" the prisoner's
release by the sending state).
123. See Speedy TriaL" Hearing on S. 754 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1973) (statement of
J. T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (under the sanction of dis-
missal with prejudice, "[s]ociety suffers ... because. .. guilty defendants would not be
convicted and would thus, unrehabilitated, continue to be a threat to the community");
see also H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (minority views of Reps. Hutchin-
son, McClory, et al.) ("The danger of a dismissal with prejudice sanction is that defend-
ants who may have committed serious crimes would be released into society.") (emphasis
in original), reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7457; 120 Cong. Rec.
41,576 (remarks of Rep. Latta) ("[The American people] do not want these criminals out
in society to redo their crimes."); idL at 41,778 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (expressing
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any violation of its conditions causes mandatory and automatic divesti-
ture of jurisdiction.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
The position advanced by this Note would invalidate some convictions
for reasons having nothing to do with guilt or innocence. 124 Further, it
would prevent the continuation of other prosecutions for the same "tech-
nical" reasons.' 25 However, the Council of State Governments deter-
mined that if detainers remained outstanding against a prisoner, the
benefits accruing from conviction in the receiving state would be out-
weighed by the harm to the prisoner's present rehabilitation.1 26 They
concluded that "society is the real loser in collecting its debt from the
offender [when detainers remain unresolved for long periods]. Much
money is spent in extra periods of imprisonment, and embittered offend-
ers become recidivists, pyramiding the expense of law enforcement."' 2 7
The Council focused on the problems detainers created for the penal sys-
tem in the sending state.' 28 Detainers were found to have "plagued penal
administrators, courts and institutional personnel," . . . . "cling[ing]
leechlike to penal progress."' 29 The Council found that the detainer sys-
tem affected four distinct groups within the state where the prisoner is
presently incarcerated: judges, correctional officials, parole authorities
his belief that "the fear might have been left in the minds of some people that this was
. . . the kind of bill that would turn criminals loose").
124. See Prisoner Transfer, supra note 12, at 517; cf Hearings on S. 895, supra note
108, at 120 (statement of W.H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
Justice) (inclusion of the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for violations of the STA's
time limits "encourages the overall interest of society by occasionally letting a guilty
defendant free").
125. See Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978) (contending that
although the government was "technically precluded from proceeding further" in its
prosecution, the court retained jurisdiction and could proceed to judgment); see also
United States v. Schrum, 504 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Kan. 1980) (reluctantly granting relief),
affdper curiam, 638 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1981); People v. Celia, 114 Cal. App. 3d 905,
921, 170 Cal. Rptr. 915, 923-24 (1981) (refusing to grant relief). The courts' irritation
with IAD claims manifests the belief that the provisions of the IAD are merely "proce-
dural rules". See supra note 78.
126. See Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 74.
127. Id.; see Baker v. Schubin, 72 Misc. 2d 413, 416, 339 N.Y.S.2d 360, 366 (Sup. Ct.
1972); Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 697-
99 (1971).
128. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978) ("[tlhe adverse effects of
detainers . . . are . . . for the most part the consequence of the lengthy duration of
detainers" while a prisoner is incarcerated); United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520
F.2d 830, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1975) (purpose of the IAD is to "minimize the adverse impact
of a foreign prosecution on rehabilitative programs of the confining jurisdiction"); People
v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 392, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (Those who par-
ticipated in the formulation of the IAD "were. . . primarily concerned with the plan-
ning and carrying out of programs for prisoner rehabilitation." Delay in disposition of
outstanding charges was objectionable because it impeded their functions.).
129. This Issue in Brief, 9 Fed. Probation, July-Sept. 1945, at 1.
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and individual prisoners themselves. 3 ° The Council proposed that states
adopt the IAD for the purpose of maximizing rehabilitative opportunities
for prisoners by minimizing the uncertainty caused by extended detain-
ers. Clearly defined procedures for prosecution of the charges underlying
detainers benefit judges, corrections officials and parole authorities in the
sending state as well as prisoners. 13 ' It allows those officials to make
informed decisions regarding the prisoner's status earlier in the prisoner's
term. 1
32
The purpose of both the UMDDA and the IAD is to provide a system
in which "detainers will not hamper the administration of correction
programs and the effective rehabilitation of criminals."' 133 These Acts
place the objective of current rehabilitation above that of the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. In fact, one of the reasons that the Council
desired to foster prompt settlement of detainers was so that the receiving
state and the sending state could "cooperate in planning effective rehabil-
itation programs for the prisoner."'' 34
The position that violations of the LAD mandatorily and automatically
divest courts in receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction provides the
best means of achieving the Council's stated aim that "[e]very effort
should be made to accomplish the disposition of detainers as promptly as
possible."' 35 Imposition of the harshest possible penalties against a re-
ceiving state that fails to comply with the provisions of the LAD fosters
the greatest degree of compliance with the IAD's terms.' 36 The IAD
places reasonable limitations on prosecution by receiving states. The
130. Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 74.
131. See supra note 63.
132. See supra note 63.
133. Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 75; see also Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106, 301 A.2d 605, 607 (1973).
134. Council of State Governments-1956, supra note 1, at 75.
135. Iad (emphasis deleted).
136. See Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 399 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978) ("The sanction
of dismissal with prejudice ... is a relatively severe sanction designed to compel
prosecutorial compliance with the procedures set forth in the IAD."); State v. Lippolis,
107 N.J. Super. 137, 145, 257 A.2d 705, 710 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) ("The sanction
[of dismissal with prejudice] is a prophylactic measure to induce compliance in the gener-
ality of cases."), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 106-07, 301 A.2d 605, 607-08 (1973) (refusing to
grant a continuance requested one day late) (quoting State v. Lippolis, 107 NJ. Super. at
145, 257 A.2d at 710, with approval); Note, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers." De-
fining the Federal Role, supra note 12, at 1033 (1978) (the penalty "is intentionally harsh
to prevent abuse of the detainer and to encourage prompt and speedy disposition of pend-
ing charges"); cf H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (adopting the position of
the American Bar Ass'n "that the only effective remedy for denial of speedy trial is abso-
lute and complete discharge") (quoting American Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Stan-
dards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 4.1 at 40 commentary
(Approved Draft 1968)) reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7430;
Steinberg, Dismissal With or Without Prejudice Under the Speedy Trial Act: A Proposed
Interpretation, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 14 (1977) ("only by a vigorous judicial
application of the remedy of dismissal with prejudice will the prosecution be deterred
from noncompliance with the [STA's] time limits").
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states have agreed to these limitations 137 for the greater benefit of soci-
ety. 131 When the IAD's limits are violated, deficient prosecutions should
end and the rehabilitative process should resume.
V. THE MA URO DECISION
Some courts and commentators have suggested that the Supreme
Court implicitly held in United States v. MauroI3 9 that IAD violations do
not divest courts in receiving states of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 ' In
Mauro, the Court noted that the cases under review' 4 1 concerned the
scope of the United States' obligations under the IAD. The cases posed
the particular question "whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum,142 used by the United States to secure the presence in federal
court of state prisoners, may be considered either a 'detainer' or a 're-
quest' within the meaning of the [IAD]."' 143 The Court stated that it
"granted certiorari. . . to consider whether the [IAD] governs the use of
writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by the United States to obtain
state prisoners." 1" The Court held that the writ "is not a detainer
within the meaning of the [IAD],' ' 45 but also held that "the United
States is bound by the [IAD] when it activates its provisions by filing a
detainer against a state prisoner and then obtains his custody by means of
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum."'' 46
Having decided that question, the Court stated that it agreed with the
Second Circuit "that respondent Ford's 4 7 failure to invoke the [IAD] in
specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the District Court did
not result in a waiver of his claim that the Government violated Art.
137. Besides the fact that the IAD is a contract, see supra notes 39-52 and accompany-
ing text, it is also a statute which must be enacted by each party-state.
138. See supra text at note 127.
139. 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
140. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. That the question is still open is
indicated by Justice White's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Kerr v. Finkbeiner,
106 S. Ct. 263 (1985). See id. at 264 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
141. United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), was consolidated with Mauro.
See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 340.
142. "[A] federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a federal court order com-
manding the immediate production of a prisoner at a federal trial .... Upon being
served with a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the state authority ... turns the
prisoner over at once to the federal custodian." United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588,
595 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), rev'd, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); see Prisoner
Transfer, supra note 12, at 492. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants federal courts the authority to
issue such writs. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(5) (1982); see also United States v. Mauro,
436 U.S. 340, 357 (1978); Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 613 n.4, 618-19 (1961).
When the United States acquires a prisoner by this writ, it need not comply with the
provisions of the IAD. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349; see L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 97
(1979).
143. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 344 (1978).
144. Id. at 349 (footnote omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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IV(c)."' 148 From this, courts and commentators have concluded that be-
cause the Court did discuss the issue of waiver, violations of the IAD are
waivable, 149 and therefore, they cannot affect the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of a court.1 50
This conclusion, however, is erroneous. The Justice Department
raised the issue of waiver in its petition for certiorari in United States v.
Ford.' The Department presented as a question whether Ford, "by
failing to raise the issue in the district court, waived the claim that his
indictment should have been dismissed for violation of the [IAD]. ' 1 2
The government contended that IAD violations are subject to waiver.'5 3
Ford's attorneys argued that Ford did not in fact waive his claim under
the IAD.' 54 The Court held that the defendant had repeatedly asserted
his rights under the IAD,'55 thus rendering moot the question whether
waiver was, in fact, possible.' 56 Thus, the Court did not take the oppor-
tunity to discuss the question whether LAD violations are waivable.
CONCLUSION
The IAD should be recognized as curtailing, when necessary, subject
148. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 364. Defendant Ford did not specifically invoke the lAD
before the trial court. Rather, he asserted his general right to a speedy trial. See UnitedStates v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1977), affid sub nom. United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). The Second Circuit decided his appeal exclusively on the
issue of the IAD violation. See id, at 736 & n.4. The Supreme Court affirmed this deter-
mination. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 364-65.
149. See Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 n.l (6th Cir. 1981) (the Court's
"factual analysis" regarding waiver by defendant Ford "would have been pointless if the
Court were of the opinion that IAD rights could not be waived"); United States v. Eaddy,
595 F.2d 341, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting language from Mauro to make the point
that IAD rights are waivable); Federal Habeas Corpus Review, supra note 26, at 986 n.71
("implicit in th[e Court's] analysis is the assumption that. . . waiver is possible").
150. Kowalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 536-37 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979); Federal Habeas Corpus Review, supra
note 26, at 986 n.71.
151. See Petition For a Writ of Certiorari at 2, 19-22, United States v. Ford, decided
sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id at 19-22. The Government pursued this argument in its memoranda of law.
See Petitioner's Brief at 53-59, United States v. Ford, decided sub nor. United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 11-14, United States v. Ford,
decided sub nor. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
154. See Brief in Opposition to the Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, United
States v. Ford, decided sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); Brief For
Respondent at 42-45, United States v. Ford, decided sub norm. United States v. Mauro,
436 U.S. 340 (1978).
155. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 364-65 (1978) ("[F]rom the time he was arrested Ford per-
sistently requested that he be given a speedy trial.").
156. In their brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari, Ford's attorneys,
after contending that their client did not in fact waive the protection of the IAD, argued:
"[I]n any event, the application of waiver principles to a particular claim under the [IAD]
does not at this point present an important question of federal law meriting Supreme
Court review." Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, United
States v. Ford, decided sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
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matter jurisdiction. The language of the IAD and the intent of its draft-
ers indicate that any violation of the IAD's provisions is intended to
divest courts of jurisdiction mandatorily and automatically. Congress
and the Justice Department also appear to have understood the IAD's
provisions to have this effect. Therefore, because violations of the IAD
divest courts of subject matter jurisdiction, relief should be granted with-
out requiring a prisoner to demonstrate actual prejudice stemming from
the violation. Acceptance of this interpretation may preclude or nullify
some prosecutions. The drafters of the IAD decided that these results
were preferable to extended, disorderly prosecutions associated with de-
tainers. 157 They accorded the prisoner's rehabilitation program prece-
dence over the receiving state's interest in prosecution. Although the
result may seem objectionable in individual cases, the severe penalties of
the lAD were included because of a legislative determination that the
benefit to society from strict enforcement of the IAD would outweigh
occasional losses of prosecutorial power over individual prisoners.
Thomas R. Clark
157. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text. See State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J.
Super. 137, 142, 257 A.2d 705, 708 (App. Div. 1969) (murder indictment dismissed be-
cause of failure to comply with the IAD's provisions), rev'd on other grounds per curiam,
55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970). The Lippolis rationale is commented on supra note 65.
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